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SUING GUN MANUFACTURERS:
A SHOT IN THE DARK
MATTHEW PONTILLO*
INTRODUCTION
There is a dangerous trend in civil litigation that threatens
to displace the well-established principles of tort law.
Manufacturers of legal products are being sued for the misuse of
their products by third parties, of which the manufacturers have
no control over. Lawsuits brought against gun manufacturers
are designed to recover the costs associated with gun violence
from the manufacturers of firearms.1 These suits are premised
on a dubious legal basis and their outcome is uncertain. 2
Typically in these cases, the harm is the result of an intervening
criminal act committed by a third party.3 It is important to
remember that the weapons at issue here function as they were
* J.D. Candidate, June 2001, St. John's University School of Law. Matthew
Pontillo is a Captain in the New York City Police Department with over fifteen
years of law-enforcement experience. He is currently assigned as the commanding
officer of the Operations Unit.
1 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (denying
defendant's motion for a judgement as a matter of law). In Hamilton, the plaintiffs
sought compensatory and punitive damages from 25 handgun manufacturers for
injuries caused by firearms. See id. at 808. Collectively, these defendants supplied
most of the handguns on the United States market. See id. The plaintiffs asserted
that the marketing and distribution practices of the defendants generated an
underground market that provided criminals with easy access to firearms. See id.
Liability was apportioned based upon a market share theory of liability. See id. at
839-46.
2 See id. Judge Weinstein held that the defendants had an obligation to exercise
reasonable care in the marketing and distribution of their products so as to guard
against criminal use. See id. But see Arimjo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 775
(D.N.M. 1987) (refusing to impose liability on handgun manufacturers for criminal
misuse).
3 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 808-10. The facts established that six of the
plaintiffs were killed and a seventh permanently disabled as a result of the criminal
misuse of a firearm by a third party in unrelated incidents. See id. In all of the
incidents except one, the guns used to commit these crimes were never recovered or
identified. See id.
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designed to and are free of mechanical defects. Usually, there is
no relationship between the manufacturer and the criminal user
of the weapon or the victim.4 In each case the manufacturers
have complied with state and federal laws regarding the
manufacture and distribution of the firearms involved.5 The
majority of the guns in question, when they have been recovered
or identified, have been lawfully passed from the manufacturer
to a licensed firearms distributor.6 Plaintiffs have succeeded in
only a limited number of cases and under narrow
circumstances. 7 Private parties, as well as local municipalities,
have brought lawsuits against manufacturers advancing a
variety of legal theories upon which to premise recovery.8 Suits
based upon products liability or strict liability theories of
recovery stand on shaky legal ground and are unlikely to succeed
because courts are unwilling to destroy established tort law
principles. 9
In private actions, plaintiffs are either those injured by gun
violence or their survivors; they seek compensatory and, in most
cases, punitive damages. 1  In municipal actions, local
4 See id. (establishing no relationship between criminal user and plaintiff); see
also, Casillas v. Auto-Ordnance Corp., No. C-95-3601FMS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7396, at *5-7 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 1996).
5 See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1313-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
Hamilton is a typical example of an action brought against gun manufacturers by
shooting victims. The plaintiffs asserted alternative causes of action alleging
negligent marketing and distribution, products liability, strict liability, and fraud.
See id. at 1314-15.
6 See, e.g., Bubalo v. Navegar, Inc., No. 96-C3664, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8551,
at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 1997).
7 See Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985) (creating an exception
that allows an action premised upon strict liability for injuries caused by poor
quality handguns commonly known as "Saturday Night Specials" even though they
function properly). But see MD. CODE ANN., art. 27, 830-I (1999) (eliminating a gun
manufacturer's strict liability for damages caused by the criminal use of any
firearm).
8 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 808 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (action brought by the
victims of criminal attacks or their survivors against gun manufacturers); Morial v.
Smith & Wesson, No. 98-18578 (La. Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 30, 1998) (action brought by
the mayor of New Orleans seeking reimbursement for the costs of providing the
emergency services necessitated by gun violence).
9 See, e.g., Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1322-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting as
untenable strict liability claims premised upon products liability as well as ultra-
hazardous activity).
10 See, e.g., Casillas, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7396, at *1-2 (commencing an
action against the manufacturer seeking compensatory and punitive damages for
non-fatal injuries caused by a criminal third party).
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governments seek compensation for the public health and law
enforcement costs incurred as a result of gun violence.'1 Making
whole those who have been injured or suffered a loss is a noble
and important endeavor. It is misguided, however, to shift the
blame from those who are responsible to those who properly
engage in a lawful activity. These suits have been inspired by
and are modeled after the litigation against the tobacco
industry.12 Accordingly, the courts have refused to impose
liability based upon the tort theories of strict liability and
products liability when the gun in question functioned properly.
To do so would open the door to the imposition of liability against
any manufacturer who produces an article that causes harm
even though it has some social utility or value.' 3 Some advocates
of manufacturer liability endorse it as a means of gun control.' 4
This approach is misguided because judicial activism in this area
will usurp the legislative process.15
I. "SEND LAWYERS, GUNS AND MONEY"'6
A. The Nature of the Gun Industry
Although the United States is the largest consumer of
11 See, e.g., Office of the Mayor, City Sues Gun Industry (visited April 1, 2000)
<http//www.cityofchicago/mayor/gunindustry/lawsuit.html>. The City of Chicago
filed a public nuisance action against gun manufacturers, distributors, and retailers
who do business in the area surrounding Chicago on November 17, 1998. The city is
seeking $433 million that the city estimates it has spent on law enforcement,
medical services and legal services since 1994 as a result of gun violence. See
Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-15596 (II. Cir. Ct. Nov. 12, 1998).
12 See David Rosenbaum, Echoes of Tobacco Battle in Gun Suits, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 1999, at A32 (noting the similarity to suits brought by forty state Attorneys
General against tobacco companies seeking to recover the expenses associated with
smoking related illnesses).
13 See WAYNE LAPIERRE, GUNS, CRIME AND FREEDOM 22-28 (1994)
(establishing the social utility of firearms as it is achieved through their use for self-
defense and as a deterrent to criminal behavior).
14 See Fox Butterfield, California Cities to Sue Gun Makers Over Sales
Methods, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1999, at A20 (indicating that the goal of a suit
against a gun manufacturer is the reformation of the gun industry and recognition
by cities that they would more likely achieve judicially what they have been unable
to achieve legislatively).
Is See, e.g., Forni v. Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73, 73 (1st Dep't 1996) (stating that
it is for the legislature to determine whether the manufacture and sale of firearms
should remain a legal endeavor).
16 WARREN ZEVON, Lawyers, Guns and Money, on EXCITABLE BOY
(Elektra/Asylum Records 1978).
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firearms in the world, it is a comparatively small $1.5 billion a
year industry.17 "[TIhere are more than 200 million guns in
circulation in the United States, and more than a third of
American households have one."'8 There are three distinct
groups of firearm manufacturers. Such well-known names as
Smith & Wesson, Colt, and Mossberg, among others, comprise
the "Gun Valley" companies, so named because of their
geographical proximity to the Connecticut River Valley in New
England. 19 The Los Angeles area is home of the "Ring of Fire"
companies, which include Lorcin, Davis Industries, and Bryco
Arms, among others.20 The final group consists of foreign
manufacturers such as Beretta and Glock.21 Almost all of the
companies are privately held; therefore, very little information is
known about their internal financial structure.22 Because of its
highly competitive nature, the gun market, while small,
produces narrow profit margins. 23 In 1998, Sturm, Ruger & Co.
(Ruger) had gross sales of $212 million and profits of just $23
million.24 This places Ruger among the most profitable gun
manufacturers. 25 Of the $212 million in gross sales, $67 million
was attributable to Ruger's business activities outside the gun
market.26
17 See William C. Symonds et al., Under Fire, BUS. WK., Aug. 16, 1999, at 63.
Gun production in the United States has averaged four million guns annually from
1995 through 1997. See id. at 64.
18 Guns in America: What Must Be Done, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 23, 1999, at 24.
19 See Symonds, supra note 17, at 63; Matt Bai, Clouds Over Gun Valley,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 23, 1999, at 34.
20 See Larry Armstrong, No Surrender From Mr. Saturday Night Special, BUS.
WK., Aug. 16, 1999, at 67. These companies produce inexpensive, small caliber,
easily concealed firearms that law enforcement personnel typically refer to as
"Saturday Night Specials" or "junk guns" because of their poor quality. See id. The
name "Ring of Fire" was coined because the companies are geographically situated
in the suburbs surrounding Los Angeles. See id. Bruce Jennings is the innovator
who created the "Saturday Night Special" industry in this country in the wake of
the Gun Control Act of 1968, which banned the foreign importation of similar
weapons. See id. Jennings is considered a hard-liner in the industry who refuses to
voluntarily alter his manufacturing and distribution strategy. See id.
21 See Symonds, supra note 17, at 63-64 (noting that each foreign manufacturer
has a United States subsidiary).
22 See id. at 64.
23 See id.
24 See id.
2 See id. Sturm, Ruger & Co. is the only publicly listed gun manufacturer in
the United States. See id. Contrast Ruger's earnings with Colt. Colt had gross sales
of $96 million with profits of just $6 million. See id.
26 See id.
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The firearms industry is heavily regulated by federal law.27
Firearm dealers must obtain a Federal Firearms License in
order to buy and sell weapons. 28 Dealers are required to have
prospective purchasers sign a sworn statement attesting to their
identity and fitness to purchase a firearm, and to conduct a
background check.29 In the event a purchaser misuses a firearm,
the violation of a regulation by the seller generally constitutes
negligence per se.30 Many states have also promulgated a
regulatory scheme concerning the manufacturing, sale, and
licensing of firearms. 31 A manufacturer who operates within the
parameters of these regulatory schemes should not be subject to
the same liability as one who violates an established regulation
or safeguard.
The gun manufacturers do not sell their products directly to
retail dealers or private consumers. Rather, most manufacturers
sell exclusively to distributors who, in turn, supply independent
retailers. 32 The retailers, in turn, provide the guns to the
consumer market. Under this two-tier approach, the
manufacturers have no involvement with the retailers.
Recently, the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized the unique
nature of the industry when it refused to hold a manufacturer
liable because the manufacturer had no control over the actions
of the dealers or retailers.33  It is unrealistic to expect a
27 See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930 (2000) (establishing a comprehensive
federal regulatory scheme that includes licensing requirements and guidelines for
the manufacture, sale and distribution of firearms).
28 See 18 U.S.C. § 923 (2000).
2 See id. § 922(c).
30 See Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 593 F.2d 526, 530 (3d Cir. 1979); K-
Mart v. Keller, 439 So. 2d 283, 285-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); see also Jamison v.
Dance's Sporting Goods, 854 F. Supp. 248, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (denying the claim
because the plaintiff failed to establish that the seller knew of the condition which
disqualified the buyer from purchasing a gun under federal law).
31 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 400.00-.10 (McKinney 2000) (establishing
licensing requirements for the possession, disposition and repair of firearms, as well
as regulations concerning the reporting of firearm thefts).
32 See Symonds, supra note 17, at 65. The nature of the industry is probably the
result of an accident of history stemming from a period when the industry was in its
infancy and the transportation and communication systems in this country were
crude. See Colt, History of Colt (visited July 6, 2000) <http://www.colt.com/
colt/htin1ilahistoryofcolt.html> (noting that in the early part of Colt's 136 year
history, the company utilized travelling "jobbers" who were essentially semi-
independent wholesalers selling to local retailers).
33 See First Commercial Trust v. Lorcin Eng'g, Inc. 900 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Ark.
1995) (holding that the manufacturer had no duty under these circumstances
20001 1171
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manufacturer to critique the business dealings of an
independent retailer who is regulated by federal-and possibly
state-law, and with whom the manufacturer has little or no
contact.
Criminals procure guns in a variety of ways. One of the
most common methods is the use of a "straw purchaser," or a
stand-in, who legally purchases a gun and subsequently
transfers it to someone else.34  Another method is the
falsification of a "Firearms Transaction Record" by a purchaser
at the time of sale.35  Criminals utilize these tactics to
circumvent statutory safeguards. Consequently, the
manufacturer does not know who ultimately possesses the gun
in question. The answer to these problems is to enact uniform
purchaser eligibility and identification measures among the
states. These measures would prevent such practices and would
render it unnecessary to impose liability upon a firm that
lawfully sells a product. The manufacturers should not be
singled out as pariahs simply because they are easy and
unpopular sources of compensation for a particular societal
shortcoming.
B. Traditional Tort Causes of Action
Plaintiffs who have been injured through the intentional or
reckless misuse of firearms by third parties have advanced a
variety of legal theories as a basis for recovery against
manufacturers. 36  Typically, plaintiffs have asserted claims
based upon strict products liability,37 strict liability by reason of
because it had no special relationship with the seller or the purchaser of the
handgun).
34 See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 826 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
Relatively few guns used to commit crimes are stolen. See id. at 838.
35 See id.
36 See Casillas v. Auto-Ordnance Corp., No. C95-3601FMS, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7396 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 1996) (including a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress which was subsequently dismissed by the court); Bubalo v.
Navegar, Inc., No. 96-C3664, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3598 (N.D. Ili. June 11, 1997)
(asserting that the manufacture and distribution of firearms constituted a public
nuisance since these policies facilitated the criminal misuse of weapons); Hamilton
v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (asserting claims based upon strict
liability for an ultra-hazardous activity, strict product's liability, fraud and
negligent marketing).
37 See, e.g., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997).
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an abnormally dangerous or ultra-hazardous activity,38 public
nuisance,39  and more recently, negligent marketing and
distribution.40 Evaluation of any such claim is necessarily
predicated upon an analysis of the controlling law in the state
whose substantive law applies to the controversy.41
1. Strict Products Liability
In McCarthy v. Olin Corp.,42 the plaintiffs, who were the
victims and survivors of a shooting rampage perpetrated by
Colin Ferguson, sued the manufacturer of the "Black Talon"
brand ammunition used in the attack.43 The plaintiffs asserted
strict products liability, claiming that the ammunition was
defective. 44 In New York, strict products liability is established
by demonstrating the existence of either a manufacturing,
warning, or design defect.45 The plaintiffs claimed defective
38 See id.
39 See Bubalo v. Navegar, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8551, at *11-14 (N.D. Ill.
June 11, 1997) (asserting claims premised upon public nuisance as well as negligent
marketing and distribution). Eventually, the court rejected all of these theories and
dismissed the plaintiffs complaint in its entirety. See Bubalo v. Navegar, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3598, at "14-15 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 1998) (dismissing the plaintiffs
remaining causes of action premised upon public nuisance); see also Developments
in the Law-The Paths of Civil 113 HARV. L. REV. 1752, 1759 (2000) (examining
modern uses for the tort of public nuisance by municipalities in notoriously criminal
matters, particularly in cases of injury resulting from use of guns).
40 See Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1314.
41 See Leslie v. United States, 986 F. Supp. 900 (D.N.J. 1997) (applying New
Jersey law and dismissing the plaintiffs strict products liability and negligence
claims against the manufacturer of ammunition that performed as intended and
advertised); Forni v. Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73, 73 (1st Dep't 1996) (applying New
York law and dismissing the plaintiffs products liability claim where the
manufacture of a bullet was legal and the bullet performed as it was designed to);
Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. A9902369, 1999 WL 809838 (Ohio Com. Pl.
Oct. 7, 1999) (applying Ohio law and dismissing the plaintiffs claim based upon
strict liability, products liability and public nuisance).
42 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997). On December 7, 1993, Colin Ferguson attacked
passengers on a Long Island Rail Road commuter train. Six passengers were killed
and nineteen others were wounded. See id.
43 See id. at 151-52. Ferguson used nine-millimeter hollow-point ammunition
called "Black Talons." The bullet is designed to expand upon impact and inflict more
tearing of flesh and bone then conventional ammunition. The ammunition was
originally designed only for use by law enforcement, but Olin made it commercially
available to consumers for approximately one year from 1992 to 1993. See id.
44 See id. at 154-55.
45 See id. (citing Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 335 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y.
1975)) (noting that a manufacturing defect occurs when the product is dangerous
because of a manufacturing mistake that renders it different from its intended
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design because the ammunition's unique ability to inflict
excessive bodily harm outweighed its utility.46  The court
dismissed the claim because when the risk-utility analysis was
applied, there was nothing wrong with the product, it performed
exactly as designed.47 The court determined that "the risks...
[arose] from the function of the product, not any defect in the
product."48 The court stated further that "[there is no reason to
search for an alternative safer design where the product's sole
utility is to kill and maim."49
2. Negligent Marketing
In McCarthy, the plaintiffs also pursued a negligent
marketing claim premised on the notion that the defendant
should have restricted sales to law enforcement agencies and
should have known that its marketing strategy would attract
"many types of sadistic, unstable and criminal personalities,
such as Ferguson."50 The court rejected the claim because the
defendant did not owe a legal duty to the plaintiffs and could not
control the criminal misuse of the "Black Talons" by Ferguson.51
The federal court sitting in diversity in McCarthy gave great
weight to a New York Appellate Division case, Forni v.
Ferguson,52 involving almost identical issues and arising out of
design); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 209-10 (N.Y. 1983)
(holding that a design defect occurs when there is a reasonable alternative to the
product's design); Torrogrossa v. Townmotor Co., 376 N.E.2d 920, 921 (N.Y. 1978)
(recognizing a warning defect results from a failure to adequately warn consumers
of potential hazards).
46 See McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 155. In New York, a plaintiff must prove that the
harm of the product outweighed its utility and that a safer alternative design was
possible. See Voss, 450 N.E.2d at 208-09.
47 See McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 155; see also Leslie v. Olin Corp., 986 F. Supp.
900, 907 (D.N.J. 1997) (holding that there is no cause of action for a non-defective
product). The court also dismissed plaintiffs assertion that the "Black Talons" were
an inherently dangerous product by finding this claim was phrased in terms of strict
products liability, which is not recognized in New York when premised upon "an
unreasonably dangerous per se product." See McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 156.
48 McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 155 (quoting McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 916 F. Supp.
366, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
49 Id. at 155.
50 Id. at 156.
51 See id. at 156-57. The McCarthy court noted that foreseeability does not
create a duty but, rather, is used to determine the scope of one's duty once such a
duty is established. See id. (citing Pulka v. Edelman, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (N.Y.
1976)).
52 648 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1st Dep't 1996).
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the same incident as in McCarthy.53 The Appellate Division
affirmed the order of the New York County Supreme Court,
dismissing the plaintiffs complaint for failing to state a cause of
action.54 The firearm and ammunition were not defective as a
matter of law because "a product's defect is related to its
condition, not its intrinsic function."55 The court noted that the
"manufacture, sale and ownership" of the gun and ammunition
in question were legally sanctioned.56 Like the McCarthy court,
the court in Forni found that there was no duty owed by the
manufacturer to the plaintiffs: "New York does not impose a
duty upon a manufacturer to refrain from the lawful distribution
of a non-defective product."57  Additionally, "[the
manufacturers... certainly had no control over the criminal
conduct of a third party."58
The New York view is typical59 and emphasizes that
"[plroducts are not generically defective merely because they are
dangerous."60 Similarly, in Casillas v. Auto-Ordnance Corp.,61 a
California court noted that "[tihe California legislature
confirmed that users of firearms, not manufacturers of legal,
nondefective firearms, are responsible for injuries caused by
firearms."62 A manufacturer is not an insurer for its product and
53 See McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 154.
54 See Forni, 648 N.Y.S.2& at 74. As in McCarthy, the plaintiffs claimed that
the gun, magazine and ammunition were defective and subject to strict products
liability. See id.
55 Id. at 74 (citing Robinson v. Reed Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 403
N.E.2d 440 (N.Y. 1980)).
56 Forni, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d (1998)
(indicating that a clear majority of jurisdictions have refused to impose liability
based upon non-defective products that are nevertheless egregiously dangerous); see
also Moore v. R.G. Indus., 789 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1986) (denying recovery under
California law when a gun was used intentionally to render the victim a
quadriplegic); Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1986)
(denying recovery under Florida law to a wife's estate when she was intentionally
killed by her husband with a properly functioning handgun); Strickland v. Fowler,
499 So. 2d 199 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (denying recovery under Louisiana products
liability law because the guns in question functioned as designed and the inherent
dangers associated with firearms were well known).
60 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (1998).
61 No. C-95-3601FMS, 1996 WL 276830 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 1996).
62 Id. at *3 (considering Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.4(b)(2), which provides that the
manufacture of a non-defective firearm is not the proximate cause of injuries
inflicted by a third party). The plaintiffs were seriously injured by gunfire during an
20001 1175
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is not required to safeguard against every conceivable misuse
when selecting design alternatives. 63  It is recognized that
"[gluns may kill; knives may maim; liquor may cause alcoholism;
but the mere fact of injury does not entitle the person injured to
recover .... [Rather] there must be something wrong with the
product, and if nothing is wrong there will be no liability."6
Furthermore, manufacturers do not have a duty to warn the
public of the dangers associated with firearms since those
hazards are obvious and generally recognized. 65
The traditional tort theories of negligence and strict
products liability do not provide a basis to hold gun
manufacturers liable for the criminal misuse of guns by others.66
The courts that have addressed the issue have consistently
refused to impose strict products liability upon the manufacturer
of a firearm that performed as it was designed.67 When the
assault but the gun in question was purchased nine years earlier by the defendant's
family. See Casillas, 1996 WL 276830, at *1.
63 See DeRosa v. Remington Arms Co., 509 F. Supp. 762, 768 (E.D.N.Y. 1981);
see also Moss v. Wolohan Lumber Co., No. 92-C7786, 1995 WL 348144, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. June 7, 1995) (rejecting the application of strict products liability for a well
made, non-defective BB gun that was used to cause an injury).
64 DeRosa, 509 F. Supp. at 769 (quoting MURPHY & SANTAGATA, ANALYZING
PRODUCT LIABILITY 4 (1979)) (alterations omitted).
65 See Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 760 (D.C. 1989) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A cmt. j. (1977)).
66 See id. at 760-61; see also John P. McNicholas & Matthew McNicholas,
Ultrahazardous Products Liability: Providing Victims of Well-Made Firearms
Ammunition To Fire Back at Gun Manufacturers, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1599 (1997)
(acknowledging that traditional theories of tort law are inappropriate or inadequate
for recovery against the manufacturers of well-made firearms that function
properly, and instead, advocating the creation of a new cause of action, Ultra-
hazardous Products Liability, that would permit consumers and bystanders to
recover from gun manufacturers).
67 See Moore v, R.G. Indus., 789 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a
gun manufacturer is not strictly liable for the injuries that result, in the absence of
negligent design, when a gun is used criminally); Shipman v. Jennings Firearms,
Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1534 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that when a gun is used in a
criminal act, the manufacturer is not strictly liable for injuries under strict products
liability); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1267-68 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding
that manufacturers who produce guns that work as designed are not strictly liable
for injuries that result from the weapons used in the commission of a crime);
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1324 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that the
plaintiffs strict liability claim for criminal misuse by a third party was not valid);
Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 761 (D.C. 1989) (holding that a police officer
who was shot and injured by a criminal could not hold manufacturers of the weapon
liable for the injuries he sustained); King v. R.G. Indus., 451 N.W.2d 874, 875 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a manufacturer could not be held strictly liable for
criminal misuse of handgun).
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plaintiff asserts a cause of action rooted in defective design
because of insufficient safety features incorporated into the
design of the weapon, the alleged defect in the weapon must be
an actual cause of the injuries sustained and not just a mere
condition.68 The intentional and reckless actions of pointing a
purportedly defective gun at another and pulling the trigger is a
superseding intervening cause that will relieve a manufacturer
of liability.69 As unpleasant as it sounds, a firearm and its
ammunition must be deadly in order to perform the function that
they were designed to achieve.
3. Abnormally Dangerous or Ultra-Hazardous Activity
Part in parcel with the strict products liability cause of
action, plaintiffs have usually included a cause of action based
upon strict liability for an abnormally dangerous or ultra-
hazardous activity.7 0 An activity may be classified as ultra-
hazardous or abnormally dangerous depending upon the facts
and circumstances of the incidentJ 1 The following factors are
relevant and should be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the
person, land, or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable
care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common
usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is
carried on; and
() extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by
its dangerous attributes.72
68 See Rodriguez v. Glock, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1073 (N.D. 111. 1998)
(denying recovery from an allegation that the gun used was unsafe and defective for
having a short trigger pull and no external safety mechanism, because the act of
pointing the gun at the victim was an intervening cause of the injuries sustained).
69 See Eichstedt v. Lakefield Arms Ltd., 849 F. Supp. 1287, 1292 (E.D. Wis.
1994) (holding that the defect was irrelevant in light of the reckless conduct of the
third party).
70 See, e.g., Hamilton 935 F. Supp. at 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (asserting
alternative causes of action).
71 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
72 Id.
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Strict liability has generally been applied to the unnatural
uses of land.73 As such, it is an inappropriate remedy for an
injury caused by a fungible good introduced into the stream of
commerce.74 Under New York law, "there is no cause of action
for an unreasonably dangerous.., product."7 5 Proponents of the
application of strict liability to gun manufacturers and
distributors claim it is necessary to insure that victims of gun
violence have a resource available to compensate them for their
damages.76 This is primarily a policy argument that establishes
an insurer's standard and ignores the substantive state law
involved. Otherwise stated, "it is a misuse of tort law, a baseless
and tortured extension of products liability principles." 77 Strict
liability for an ultra-hazardous activity arises from the use of a
product and not its manufacture; therefore, the production of a
handgun is not abnormally dangerous. 78
To recognize liability of a manufacturer or distributor would
virtually make them the insurer for such products... even
though... [they] are not negligently made nor contain any
defects. Although such a social policy may be adopted by the
legislature, it ought not to be imposed by judicial decree. 79
73 See Doundoulakis v. Hempstead, 368 N.E.2d 24, 27 (N.Y. 1977); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. j (1977). In the seminal decision of
Rylands v. Fletcher, 13 Hurl & C. 774 (1865), the storage of water was deemed an
ultra-hazardous activity and the landowner was held liable when the water escaped
causing damage to adjoining property.
74 See Copier v. Smith & Wesson, 138 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 1998); McCarthy v.
Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1998); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307
(E.D.N.Y. 1996); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771 (D.N.M. 1987); Merrill v.
Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Burkett v. Freedom Arms,
Inc., 704 P.2d 118 (Or. 1985); Diggles v. Horowitz, 765 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989).
75 McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 156; see also supra note 47.
76 See E. Judson Jennings, Saturday Night. Ten P.M.: Do You Know Where
Your Handgun Is?, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 31 (1997) (recognizing the
ineffectiveness and impracticality of gun control measures and instead advocating
strict liability and mandated insurance coverage in order to provide victims of gun
violence with adequate compensation).
77 Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1208 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
78 See Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir.
1984) (holding that the manufacturing of handguns is not an ultra-hazardous
activity); Casillas v. Auto-Ordnance Corp., No. C95-3601FMS, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7396, at *13 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 1996) (holding that because the legitimate use
of firearms is not ultra-hazardous by statute, the manufacturing and sale cannot be
ultra-hazardous).
79 Bubalo v. Navegar, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8551, at *13 (N.D. M11. June
11, 1997) (quoting Martin, 743 F.3d at 1204).
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In addition, "Itihere are some products which, in the present
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made
safe for their intended and ordinary use."80 Strict liability,
"carried to its logical extension" would make the production "of
any product that is significantly misused and has a great
potential for injuring or killing persons... an ultra-hazardous
activity."8 ' For example, it "is a statistical certainty that
thousands of people will be killed in alcohol-related accidents."8 2
Firearms and ammunition are, by necessity, inherently
dangerous.83 Courts that have considered the question have
rejected the application of strict liability for abnormally
dangerous activity to firearms manufacturing.8 4 The imposition
of strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity is an
inappropriate means of circumventing the principle of products
liability, which is the appropriate method of recovery when
dealing with manufactured goods.
In Copier v. Smith & Wesson,85 the plaintiff asserted that
because handguns were designed to inflict injury and it was a
statistical certainty that some handguns actually do cause harm,
handgun production was an ultra-hazardous activity.86 The
80 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
81 Copier v. Smith & Wesson, 138 F.3d 833, 838 (10th Cir. 1998).
82 Id; see also Baker v. State, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 2154, at *6 (Tex. Ct. App.
1999); State v. Church, 530 So.2d 1235, 1242 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (Jones, J.,
concurring) (indicating that "2.1 million Americans were killed in alcohol related
accidents prior to 1975 and in 1980 alone 650,000 were injured in accidents
involving alcohol").
83 See Moore v. R.G. Indus., 789 F.2d 1326, 1328 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that a
strict liability claim against a handgun manufacturer failed as a matter of law,
because manufacturing of handguns is not an ultra-hazardous activity); Shipman v.
Jennings Firearms, 791 F.2d 1532, 1534 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that the
manufacture and sale of guns are not ultra-hazardous or inherently dangerous
activities); Casillas v. Auto-Ordnance Corp., No. C-95-3601 FMS, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7396, at *13-15 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 1996); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F.
Supp. 771, 773 (D.N.M. 1987), affd, 843 F.2d 406, 407 (10th Cir. 1988); Caveny v.
Raven Arms Co., 665 F. Supp. 530, 532-33 (S.D. Ohio 1987), affd, 849 F.2d 608 (6th
Cir. 1988); Kelley v. R.G. Industries, 497 A.2d 1143, 1147-50 (Md. 1985);
Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751, 753-54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Coulson v.
DeAngelo, 493 So.2d 98, 99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Riordan v. International
Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1297 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
84 See, e.g., Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 760 (D.C. 1989). The plaintiff,
a policeman, was shot by John Hinckley during the attempted assassination of
President Ronald Reagan. See id. at 759.
85 138 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 1998). Tanya Copier was shot and paralyzed by her
ex-husband with a revolver manufactured by the defendant. See id. at 834.
86 See id.
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court considered the factors listed in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts used to determine abnormally dangerous activities.8 7
"None of the.., factors... [are] implicated by the
manufacturing of handguns, as opposed to the use-or rather,
the misuse-of handguns." 8
4. Public Nuisance
The municipal plaintiffs, as well as some of the private
plaintiffs, have asserted that the manufacture and sale of
firearms constitutes a public nuisance.8 9 A public nuisance is
created by an unreasonable interference with a right common to
the general public.90 In Bubalo v. Navegar, Inc.,91 the plaintiffs
asserted that the defendant manufacturer created a public
nuisance by manufacturing and distributing a semi-automatic
pistol.92 Upon a rehearing of the defendant's motion to dismiss
the complaint, the court dismissed the public nuisance cause of
action.93 The court applied the same rationale used to reject the
'7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
88 Copier, 138 F.3d at 836.
89 See, e.g., Bubalo v. Navegar, Inc., No. 96-C3664, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8551,
at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 1997) (claim asserted by a private plaintiff against a gun
manufacturer); Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. A9902369, 1999 WL 809838,
at *2 (Ohio Com. Pl. Oct. 7, 1999) (municipal suit by the City of Cincinnati against
manufacturers, distributors and trade associations).
90 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979). The factors used in
determining whether an activity creates an unreasonable interference with a public
right include consideration of:
(a) whether the conduct involves a significant interference with the public
health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort, or the public
convenience, or
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute ordinance or
administrative regulation, or
c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a
permanent or long-lasting effect and, as the actor knows or has reason to
know, has a significant effect upon the public right.
Id. § 821B(2).
91 No. 96-C3664, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8551 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 1997).
92 See id. at *4-6. A pistol manufactured by the defendant was used to shoot
two Chicago Police Officers during the commission of a burglary. See id. The
perpetrator of the offense was apprehended and subsequently convicted at a
criminal trial. See id. The asserted public right that was interfered with by the
manufacture and distribution of the firearm was the right "to be free from
disturbance and reasonable apprehension of danger to person and property." Id. at
*4 (citation omitted).
93 See Bubalo v. Navegar, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3598, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16,
1998).
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application of strict liability.94  Liability imposed upon a
manufacturer, in the absence of a defect, amounts to an insurer's
standard and is an action that is properly within the purview of
the legislature and should not be imposed by a judicial decree. 95
The court was also reluctant to recognize a new theory of
nuisance under then existing state law.96 A public nuisance
cause of action fails when the defendant manufacturer does not
substantially participate in carrying on the activity that
constitutes the nuisance.97
In Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,98 the court rejected a
nuisance cause of action because the nuisance lay in the
manufacturers' alleged negligent manufacture and distribution
of firearms, which are lawful products. 99  Nuisance was
inappropriate because "[a] separate body of law (strict product
liability and negligence) has been developed to cover the design
and manufacture of products."100 In the case of guns, "the
nuisance [created] is the criminal or reckless misuse of firearms
by third parties who are beyond the control of the defendants"
and not their manufacture. 1 1 To allow the application of a
public nuisance cause of action "to the design and manufacture
of lawful products would be to destroy the separate tort
principles which govern those activities."10 2
Proponents of manufacturer liability contend that firearm
design contributes to both intentional and unintentional
shootings. 10 3  They advocate an alternative safer design
incorporating passive safety features or "smart gun technology"
to prevent the use of the firearm by anyone other than the
owner.104 The rationale of this proposition is that manufacturer
94 See id. at *12-15.
95 See id. at *13.
96 See id. at *14.
97 See id. at *10.
98 No. A9902369, 1999 WL 809838 (Ohio Com. P1. Oct. 7, 1999).
9 See id. at *2.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 See Mark D. Polston & Douglas S. Weil, Unsafe By Design: Using Tort
Actions To Reduce Firearms-Related Injuries, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 13 (1997)
(advocating the application of strict liability to manufacturers and gun owners in
order to induce them to prevent injuries and practice safe storage techniques).
104 See id. at 15-16.
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liability will provide a technology forcing incentive. 10 5 Colt is
already in the process of developing a "smart gun"10 6 and it
claims that it may have a working prototype in as early as two
years. 10 7 Colt estimates that development will cost as much as
$40 million, however, it is currently forced to spend more of its
limited assets on litigation than on the development of a
commercially viable "smart gun."08 There is already a strong
incentive to develop smart-gun technology without litigation.
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted a two-year
feasibility study for the National Institute of Justice regarding
"smart guns" because there is a need in the law enforcement
community for this technology.10 9 One out of every six police
officers who is killed in the line of duty is shot with his or her
own gun.110 Given the rather large army of law enforcement
personnel in this country, there is a very strong commercial
incentive for manufacturers to develop a viable "smart gun" for
use by the law enforcement community."' Until the technology
105 See id. at 17-18.
108 See Iver Peterson, Smart Guns Set Off Debate: How Smart Will They Really
Be?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1998, at B1. "Smart guns" are designed to restrict use to
the owner of the weapon. The Colt prototype uses a radio transponder contained
inside of a bracelet that sends a signal to a receiver in the gun allowing the weapon
to function. The transponder has a limited range and must be within a few inches of
the gun. There are still serious doubts as to reliability, battery life and resistance to
abuse. See id. Colt vows that it is committed to the development of personalized gun
technology, but cautions that the technology is not yet mature and issues involving
product safety and reliability have not yet been resolved. See Colt, Colt's Position on
Personalized Weapons Technology (visited April 1, 2001) <http://www.colt.com/
colt/html/klpositionpaper.html>.
107 See Leslie Wayne, Colt Best Defense; In Difficult Times, a Gun Maker Tries
to Counterattack, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1999, at C1 (estimating that a commercially
available "smart gun" could be ready within four years).
108 See id. Although Colt has received a $500,000 grant from the government to
develop a "smart gun," financing is a significant problem for them. See id. In 1997,
the company earned only $2 million in profits on sales of $96 million. See id.
109 See Inside Sandia, 'Smart Gun' Could Reduce Threat to Police (visited April
1, 2000) <http://www.sandia.gov>.
110 See id. Approximately one police officer a month between 1979 and 1993 was
killed during one of these take-away situations. See id. A "smart gun" would prevent
these occurrences. See id.
111 As of June 1996, there were approximately 74,500 full-time federal law
enforcement officers authorized to carry weapons. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 1996 (1998). This is an average
of 28 officers for every 100,000 inhabitants. See id. On the state and local level,
there are 2.4 law enforcement officers for every 1000 people in the population of the
Unites States. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 1998 291 (1999). New York City boasts the largest police department in the
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is available and reliable, there will be no better alternative to
current handgun design. In order to facilitate the research and
development of more effective and safer firearms, which is
critical to law enforcement, the private gun companies must
remain economically viable and competitive.
C. Quasi Exception to Strict Liability
In Kelly v. R.G. Industries,112 the Maryland Court of Appeals
carved out an exception to the state's common law by allowing
the imposition of strict liability against a gun manufacturer
under certain circumstances. The plaintiff, Olen J. Kelly was
shot in the course of an armed robbery of the grocery store where
he was employed. 113 The court refused to impose strict liability
upon the manufacture of firearms as an abnormally dangerous
or ultra-hazardous activity because the application of this
doctrine was limited to the owners or occupiers of land under
Maryland law.114 The court next considered the product liability
claim. The consumer expectation test failed since a product is
not defective simply because it is capable, by design, of inflicting
harm and consumers reasonably expect firearms to be
dangerous. 115 The risk utility test was inapplicable because that
test only applies when a product malfunctions, here the gun
functioned as designed.116  The court then indicated that
"Saturday Night Specials" were not sanctioned as a matter of
public policy and stated:
Saturday Night Specials are generally characterized by short
barrels, light weight, easy concealability, low cost, use of cheap
quality materials, poor manufacture, inaccuracy and
unreliability. These characteristics render the Saturday Night
Special particularly attractive for criminal use and virtually
useless for the legitimate purposes of law enforcement, sport,
and protection of persons, property and businesses. 117
The court reasoned that the legislative policies of the United
States' Congress and the Maryland General Assembly, as
country with 39,149 members. See id at 337.
112 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985).
113 See id. at 1144.
114 See id. at 1147 (noting that this decision was consistent with the other
jurisdictions that have confronted the issue).
115 See id. at 1148.
116 See id. at 1149.
117 Id. at 1153-54.
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manifested in various gun control statutes, reflected the view
that "Saturday Night Specials" should be treated differently
from other handguns and that they have no legitimate place in
American society. 118 The court held that, "consistent with public
policy," manufacturers of Saturday Night Specials are strictly
liable to innocent victims of the criminal use of their products
and that it is for the trier of fact to determine if a handgun is a
"Saturday Night Special." 119 That holding was subsequently
nullified by the Maryland legislature which statutorily exempted
gun manufacturers from strict liability for injuries caused by the
criminal act of a third party.120 Other jurisdictions that have
confronted the issue have refused to adopt the exception for
"Saturday Night Specials."121 Carving out a special class or
category of firearms can be problematic when one attempts to
define the characterigtics of the class. 122 For example, low cost
may be an attractive feature to criminals but it may also be
indicative of efficient manufacturing, innovative design and the
use of new materials. Therefore, these features may be equally
attractive to law-enforcement agencies as well as others who
lawfully use firearms.
II. MODERN ATTACKS ON MANUFACTURERS
A. Novel Approaches
A negligent distribution cause of action may apply to a
firearms manufacturer who fails to employ reasonable means to
prevent the sale of guns to those who are likely to misuse
them.123 Under the doctrine of negligent entrustment, "[o]ne
118 See id. at 1154-59 (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1999) prohibits the
importation of Saturday Night Specials into the United States).
119 See id. at 1159-60.
120 See MD. CODE ANN., Crimes and Punishments art. 27, § 36-I(h)(1) (1999)
(preventing the application of strict liability for any harm caused by a firearm that
was perpetrated by a third party).
121 See Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1534 (11th Cir.
1986); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1266 (5th Cir. 1985); Delahanty v.
Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 761-62 (D.C. 1989).
122 See Delahanty, 564 A.2d at 762 (stating that one characteristic that would
put guns into this special category is the fact that they are cheap).
123 See Bubalo v. Navegar, No. 96-C3664, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8551, at "15-
16 (N.D. M. June 13, 1997) (rejecting the claim because, under Illinois law,
manufacturers of non-defective firearms have no duty to control the legal
distribution beyond a legitimate sale).
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who supplies.., a chattel for the use of another whom the
supplier knows or has reason to know... [is] likely... to use it
in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to...
others... is subject to liability."1 24 Therefore, the manufacturer
must know or have reason to know the identity of the ultimate
purchaser or, alternatively, the location where the weapon is
going to end up. The nature of the gun industry does not provide
for, or facilitate, such notice. Realistically, the manufacturer's
liability ends once the firearm is legally transferred to a licensed
dealer.125 The negligent distribution theory, used in Hamilton v.
Accu-Tek, 126 was based upon the premise that "the gun
companies knew or should have known that oversupplying guns
to southern states with weak gun laws led to 'the iron pipeline'--
the shipping of guns up [Interstate] 95 for illegal use in strong
gun control states like New York."127
The theory of negligent marketing as applied to gun
manufacturers, contemplates the imposition of liability when a
manufacturer utilizes methods of packaging and promotion that
induce someone who is likely to misuse a firearm to purchase
one. 123 Under this theory, the method of marketing must have
been a factor in the third party's decision to purchase the
firearm. 29 The fact that a manufacturer advertises a product
that has distinguishing features is insufficient to impose liability
even if those features are destructive in nature. 30 Liability for
advertising distinguishing features, such as the lethality of
firearms, is tantamount to imposing limitless liability and
making a manufacturer an insurer against the criminal misuse
124 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965).
125 See Bubalo, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8551, at *15-16; Robinson v. Reed-
Prentice, 403 N.E.2d 440, 443 (N.Y. 1980) (stating that a manufacturer is not
obligated to trace its product through every step of the distribution process).
126 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
127 Mark Hamblett, Solo Counsel in Gun Case Gets Win With a Little Help, N.Y.
L.J., February 18, 1999, at 8 (reporting comments by Elisa Barnes, Esq., counsel for
the plaintiffs, discussing the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in Hamilton v.
Accu-Tek).
128 See Bubalo, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8551, at *19-29 (dismissing the
plaintiffs claim because there was no causal relationship between the alleged
negligent marketing practices and the injury); see also Resteiner v. Sturm, Ruger &
Co., 566 N.W.2d 53, 54 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that there is no cause of
action for negligent marketing for the criminal misuse of a gun without a special
relationship between the manufacturer and the victims).
129 See Bubalo, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8551, at *23-28.
130 See McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 916 F. Supp. 366, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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of its products. 131 When making the decision to purchase a
particular firearm, a law enforcement agency or a citizen wants
to know that they are getting the best that technology has to
economically offer. The overwhelming majority of appellate
decisions have rejected negligence causes of action and have held
that there is no duty to refrain from the lawful manufacture or
sale of firearms.132
In Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, the plaintiffs, victims of gun
violence perpetrated by third parties who obtained and used
firearms unlawfully, brought a suit against forty-nine gun
manufacturers. 133  The manufacturers defended by asserting
that they manufacture and sell a legal product in compliance
with federal and state law regarding the distribution of
firearms. 134  The court noted that compliance with these
regulations does not preclude a negligence action and is only
evidence of due care by the defendants. 35 The plaintiffs claimed
that the firearms were defectively designed because they did not
incorporate anti-theft or other passive safety devices designed to
prevent their use by those other than the legitimate owner.136
The court rejected this claim because the plaintiffs were unable
to establish that such devices existed or that they would
constitute a reasonable alternative design. 137 Strict liability for
an ultra-hazardous activity was also rejected because this cause
of action pertains primarily to the hazardous uses of land.'3s The
court found that the marketing of dangerous handguns was
beyond the scope of this principle. 39 The suit additionally
claimed that the manufacturers marketed and distributed
handguns in a negligent manner that facilitated the growth of
131 See Leslie v. United States, 986 F. Supp. 900, 913 (D.N.J. 1997).
132 See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 203 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(Haerle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that there have been
sixteen appellate cases since 1983 in which a cause of action premised upon
negligence has been dismissed).
133 See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1313 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
134 See id at 1314; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-30 (1999) (establishing an
extensive regulatory scheme applicable to the sale and distribution of firearms).
135 See Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1320-21.
136 See id. at 1321-22.
137 See id. at 1324.
138 See id.
139 See id. The court also rejected a cause of action premised upon fraud
because any representations made by the manufacturers were directed at the
consumers of firearms and not the plaintiffs. See id.
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the illicit underground handgun market.140 The plaintiffs were
faced with a proof problem because some of the victims were
unable to identify the particular gun used to cause their
injuries. 141
Because only some form of collective liability142 would allow
recovery, the court adopted a national market share theory of
apportioning responsibility among manufacturers, theorizing
that the New York Court of Appeals would do the same because
of its history of innovation. 143 The Court of Appeals had adopted
the market share theory for apportioning liability in cases
involving the generic anti-miscarriage drug DES. 44  The
Hamilton court disregarded the explicit warning provided by the
New York Court of Appeals:
We stress, however, that the DES situation is a singular case,
with manufacturers acting in a parallel manner to produce an
identical, generically marketed product, which causes injury
many years later, and which has evoked a legislative response
reviving previously barred actions. Given this unusual scenario,
it is more appropriate that the loss be borne by those that
produced the drug for use during pregnancy, rather than by
those who were injured by the use, even where the precise
manufacturer of the drug cannot be identified in a particular
action.145
The latent characteristic of the harm to the victims, long
latency period, and the legislative intervention altering the
statute of limitations were apparently critical elements affecting
140 See id. at 1314.
141 See id. at 1325.
142 See id. at 1329 (stating that collective liability enables the establishment of
liability where proving causation is impossible and establishing a method of damage
apportionment among the co-defendants).
143 See id. at 1327-29. The court rejected the "concerted activity" and
"enterprise liability" theories of recovery since the former requires a tacit agreement
to commit a tort and the latter requires joint control through a trade association or
similar organization. See id. at 1331. The court found that the manufacturers'
lobbying and participation in trade associations was protected by the First
Amendment under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See id. at 1316-21. Lobbying
activity is not protected when it is a "sham" designed to disguise an attempt to
injure a competitor or when the political activity involves illegal or unethical means.
See id. at 1317.
144 See id. at 1328. The court reasoned that market share theory was necessary
when the situation made it impracticable to prove which defendant caused the
injury. See id. at 1329.
145 Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1075 (N.Y. 1989).
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the New York court's decision.146  The situation with gun
manufacturers is patently different because there has been no
legislative intervention against the manufacturers and the
hazards of firearms are widely known and a matter of common
sense. National market share is also inappropriate because it
includes all sales of firearms and does not distinguish between
guns that were negligently and non-negligently sold. DES, by
contrast, was potentially harmful with every sale and when used
as it was intended.147
After a four-week trial, fifteen of the manufacturers were
found to have negligently marketed and distributed firearms. 148
Damages were only awarded to Stephen Fox and his mother and
were apportioned according to the national market share of the
three manufacturers who could have produced the weapon that
caused his injuries. 149 The defendants' motions to dismiss and
for a judgement as a matter of law were denied. °50 Judge Jack
Weinstein recommended, in his opinion, that the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals certify the question of national market share
liability to the New York Court of Appeals. 1 1
The defendants, in their motions, argued that they did not
owe a duty to the plaintiffs under traditional tort principles. 152
The court disagreed and determined that a duty was created
because the manufacturer's special ability to detect and prevent
risks created a protective relationship with foreseeable
victims. 153  The court reasoned that the jury could have
concluded that the manufacturers were aware of the propensity
of their products to make it into the illegal market. 154 Under this
approach any manufacturer can be liable for the conduct of a
146 See id.
147 See id. at 1072 (stating that DES may cause "harmful latent effects" for
children of mothers who took DES).
148 See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 808 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
149 See id. at 808-09.
150 See id. at 802.
151 See id. at 847-48.
152 See id. at 821; see also Waters v. New York City Hous. Auth., 505 N.E.2d
922, 924-25 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that there is no duty to provide for the security
and safety of pedestrian passersbys from the criminal acts of third parties and
recognizing that to do so would create limitless liability).
153 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 821-22. But see Purdy v. Public Adm'r, 526
N.E.2d 4, 7 (N.Y. 1988) (refusing to impose a duty to anticipate the criminal or
tortious acts of third parties).
154 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 831-33.
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third party no matter how egregious or distant the illicit activity
is from the manufacturer.
According to the court, the manufacturer's ability to control
the downstream distributors and retailers created a duty.155
This finding was based in large part on the testimony of Robert
Hass, a former vice-president for marketing at Smith &
Wesson. 156 He indicated that the gun manufacturers could do
more to stem the flow of guns into the illegal market by isolating
retailers who either repeatedly made multiple sales or had large
numbers of guns traced back to them. 5 7 The court reasoned that
manufacturers could decline to do business with unscrupulous
dealers, limit sales at unregulated gun shows and require that
transactions take place inside legitimate retail
establishments. 158  This reasoning disregards the inherent
nature of the industry's two-tier structure. Under the present
two-tier system, manufacturers have little opportunity to
discover where their products ultimately end up. Judge
Weinstein attempted to distinguish the Hamilton case from
other leading cases such as McCarthy v. Olin Corp.159 and Forni
v. Ferguson. 60 He stated that those cases sought to impose
liability upon the manufacturers for marketing a dangerous
product while Hamilton focused on the method of marketing.' 61
But, in McCarthy and Forni, marketing methods were also
challenged. The courts in those cases found that there was no
duty to refrain from a lawful act and recognized that the
defendants could not be expected to control the actions of a third
person.162 The Hamilton court, however, found a duty despite
the general reluctance of New York courts to impose a duty to
anticipate the criminal or tortious acts of third parties. 163 Such
liability may destroy a defendant's ability to provide a socially
useful product or service; it is also inherently unfair to impose a
duty upon someone who could do little to prevent the harm. 164
155 See id. at 821-22.
156 See id. at 832.
157 See id.
158 See id. at 826.
159 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997).
160 648 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1st Dep't 1996).
161 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 824-25.
162 See McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 156-57; Forni, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
163 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 819-22.
16 See id. (distinguishing handguns from other, more acceptable, endeavors).
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The jury in Hamilton awarded $500,000 to Stephen Fox,165
who was left paralyzed after being shot in the head.166 For the
first time, a jury returned a verdict against a gun manufacturer
in a negligence case involving non-defective firearms. 16 7 If the
verdict is subsequently appealed, many experts believe that the
law is ultimately on the side of the defendants. 168
Similarly, the California Court of Appeals recently held that
an action for the negligent marketing and distribution of a
firearm could be maintained against a gun manufacturer for the
injuries sustained as a result of a third party criminal act.169
The court found that the defendant owed a duty of care to the
plaintiffs. It also found that there was a triable issue of fact as
to whether they breached that duty by affirmatively placing and
marketing a weapon into a stream of commerce that had a
propensity for criminal misuse and clientele. 170 The court was
influenced by a legislative finding that the particular gun
involved was, by definition, an "assault weapon," banned by
165 See id. at 808-09, 820-21 (outlining the shooting of Stephen Fox).
166 See Fox Butterfield, Verdict Against Gun Makers is Likely to Prompt More
Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1999, at B1. Richard Feldman, executive director of the
American Shooting Sports Council, commented that the amount of the verdict was
indicative of how insignificant the verdict was. See id. at B6. He said, "[i]n New
York, $500,000 for brain damage is nothing these days, folks." Id.
167 The first case to reach a jury asserting negligent marketing and distribution
was Halberstam v. S.W. Daniel, Inc., No. 95-Civ.3323 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). In the end,
the jury found in favor of the defendant because the link between the defendants
marketing practices and the criminal use of the gun was too tenuous. Interestingly,
this case was litigated before Judge Jack Weinstein, the same judge who presided
over the Hamilton v. Accu-Tek case. See Timothy D. Lytton, Negligent Marketing:
Halberstam v. Daniel and the Uncertain Future of Negligent Marketing Claims
Against Firearms Manufacturers, 64 BROoK. L. REV. 681 (1998).
168 See Symonds, supra note 17, at 65-66. Harvard Law Professor W. Kip
Viscusi noted that the law favors manufacturers, but warns that this may be
irrelevant because "[i]f you get enough of these claims lodged against you, all you
need is one jury getting mad at you." Id. at 66; see also Merrill v. Navegar, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 146, 203 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (Haerle, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (criticizing Judge Weinstein's holding and suggesting that it runs contrary
to precedent established by the Second Circuit).
169 See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171-78. In Merrill, the action was brought by
the victims and survivors of those killed in a shooting rampage perpetrated by Gian
Ferri inside of a law firm located at 101 California Street on July 1, 1993. See id. at
152. Ferri was armed with two nine-millimeter semi-automatic pistols
manufactured by the defendant. See id. At the conclusion ofhis rampage, Ferri took
his own life. See id. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the
cause of action asserting a claim premised on the theory of ultra-hazardous activity.
See id. at 190-92.
170 See id. at 161-89.
1190
SUING GUN MANUFACTURERS
California statute.17 1 The weapon was deemed to be a particular
hazard when possessed by criminals that served no legitimate
sporting purpose. 172 The holding here, much like the "Saturday
Night Special" exception, 173 seems specifically tailored to the
particular facts of this case. Like the "Saturday Night Special,"
the gun in question was an "assault weapon," as specifically
defined by state statute, 74 and the legislature had already
addressed the issue. The term "assault weapon," however, is
something of a misnomer. Mechanically, these firearms function
in the same manner as any other semi-automatic weapon and
differ only in their cosmetic appearance. 7 5 Merrill v. Navegar
has been criticized as "an egregious exercise in judicial
legislation,"176 and contrary to established tort principles. 7 7 The
Merrill court's holding may be short lived since the California
Supreme Court has decided to review the matter. 7 8
The Hamilton court's conclusion emphasized the proposition
that the manufacturers had constructive notice of the diversion
of firearms into the illegal market. 179  In order for a
manufacturer to prevent risks and control distributors, it must
have information regarding the propensity with which its
firearms get into the hands of criminals. 80 The manufacturer
must also be able to identify the source distributor or retailer
who supplied the crime gun in order to have a realistic
171 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12275.5, 12276 (Deering 1999); see also Merrill, 89
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171.
172 See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171-78. The court distinguished another
California statute in reaching its conclusion. California Civ. Code § 1714(a) states
that in a products liability action, a non-defective firearm is not the proximate cause
of injuries caused by third parties. The court reasoned that the case at bar was not
cast in terms of products liability but rather negligence. Therefore, the statutory
exemption did not apply. See id. at 175-77.
173 See supra notes 117-122 and accompanying text.
174 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12276 (Deering 1999).
175 See LAPIERRE, supra note 13, at 52-60.
176 Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 193 (Haerle, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
177 See id. at 193-215.
178 See Merrill v. Navegar, 991 P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000) (granting the defendant's
motion to review the California Court of Appeals' decision).
179 See Timothy D. Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime
Related Injuries: Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System in Regulating the
Firearms Industry, 65 Mo. L. REV. 1, 38-42 (2000); see also Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,
62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 831 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
180 See Lytton, supra note 179, at 38-42.
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opportunity to take appropriate remedial measures. 81 The issue
of notice is especially relevant when the gun in question has a
short "time-to-crime." 82 In these situations, the gun is closer to
the manufacturer in the chain of commerce, which affords the
manufacturer a better opportunity to exert its influence upon
downstream consumers. 83 The manufacturer will be more likely
to have the ability to identify rouge dealers and thwart the illicit
traffic in guns.
Recently, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(ATF) has "significantly increased [its] efforts to determine how
felons and other prohibited persons... obtain firearms." 184
Historically, the ATF has not routinely traced all firearms that
were recovered by local police, including those used during the
commission of crimes. 85 The gun traces are necessary to provide
the manufacturers with the accurate information they need to
curtail the flow of guns into the underground market. If all of
the guns used in crimes are not traced, the manufacturers will
not be able to determine how and in what quantities their guns
are being unlawfully used. This will inhibit any potential
remedial action. The manufacturers are only now beginning to
get the information they need from the ATF.18 6 Because of this
inconsistent flow of information, the Hamilton court's analysis is
flawed and the connection between the manufacturers and crime
is tenuous at best.
B. The Tobacco Factor and Municipal Suits
On June 20, 1997, the Attorneys General of forty states
181 See id.
182 U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., GUN CRIME IN THE
AGE GROUP 18-20 13 (1999) [hereinafter GUN CRIME]. "Time-to-crime is the time it
takes for a gun to move from the shelf of a federally licensed firearms dealer to
recovery by a law enforcement official in connection with a crime." Id. at 13. Over
43% of the guns recovered in the 27 cities participating in the Youth Crime Gun
Interdiction Initiative had a time-to-crime of three years or less. See id.
183 See Lytton, supra note 179, at 38-42.
184 GUN CRIME, supra note 182, at 2.
185 See id. at 2-3. Local law enforcement was encouraged to submit crime guns
to the National Tracing Center in order to identify the licensed dealer and the
purchaser. See id. '"Te National Tracing Center of ATF traces firearms to their
original point of sale upon the request of police agencies [but these agencies] do not
request traces on all firearms used in crimes." MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST., GUNS USED IN CRIME 4 (1995).
186 See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
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suing the tobacco industry and the tobacco companies announced
that they had reached a settlement in the litigation. 8 7 The suits
were brought to recover health care costs incurred by the states
as a result of smoking related ailments. 188 The combination of
state suits and private plaintiff class action suits threatened the
very existence of the industry 8 9 The settlement of the tobacco
litigation has inspired various municipalities to bring actions
against the gun manufacturers in an effort to achieve similar
results.190 Many of the same trial lawyers who spearheaded the
tobacco litigation are involved in the suits against the gun
companies. 191 Philadelphia Mayor Edward Rendell was the first
to publicly propose that municipalities sue gun manufacturers to
recover the law enforcement and health care costs related to
firearm violence. 192 Similar to the manner in which cigarette
companies targeted children, the gun companies are accused of
targeting criminals, even if only tacitly doing so.193 In addition
to the municipalities, the NAACP has also filed a suit in the
187 See Maria G. Bianchini, The Tobacco Agreement That Went Up in Smoke:
Defining the Limits of Congressional Intervention into Ongoing Mass Tort
Litigation, 87 CAL. L. REV. 703, 705 (1999). Bianchini provides a summary of the
history of the tobacco litigation and the proposed settlement. See id. Under the
proposed settlement, the FDA would be granted regulatory authority over tobacco,
advertising would be further restricted, tobacco companies would have to take
affirmative steps to reduce underage smoking, and the companies would have to pay
$368.5 billion. See id. at 707-09. Initially, the tobacco companies supported the
agreement because it contained an immunity provision that prevented suits based
upon claims of addiction, eliminated punitive damages, and fixed a yearly cap on
damages. See id. The parties sought congressional approval of the settlement which
would make it more difficult to challenge later on. See id. at 713-15. The proposed
bill became stalled in committee because the immunity provision was removed and
the tobacco industry lobbied against it. See id. at 713-16.
188 See id. at 711-12.
189 See id. at 710.
190 See Newark to Join Lawsuits Against Gun Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
1999, at B8; see also Bai supra note 19, at 34 (indicating that 24 municipalities have
filed suits against the gun industry).
191 See, e.g., Newark, supra note 190, at B8 (noting that, at the time, lawyers at
Sarah Brady's Center to Prevent Handgun Violence had sixteen cases pending
against the tobacco industry at once).
192 See Matt Bai, Targeting Gun Makers, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 13, 1998, at 37. The
suit brought by the City of Bridgeport, Connecticut in Ganim v. Smith & Wesson
Corp., was dismissed because it sought to regulate firearms in a manner preempted
by state law. See Ganim v. Smith & Wesson, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3330, at *18
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 1999). Additionally, the city lacked standing, either
statutorily or under the common law, to recoup its law enforcement and healthcare
expenditures. See id. at *4.
193 See Rosenbaum, supra note 12, at A32.
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Eastern District of New York. 194 Interestingly, the suit seeks
only injunctive relief against the manufacturers rather than
monetary damages. 95  The suit asks the court to impose
restrictions regarding sales practices that are alleged to
facilitate the "underground market in illegal handguns."196
Recently, the White House and the Department of Housing and
Urban Development announced plans to assist local housing
authorities in bringing suits against the gun industry as a
means of recovering the costs associated with the misuse of
firearms as well as bringing about changes in the industry.197
The tobacco and gun controversies are analogous in that the
manufacturers in both fields produce dangerous products. There
are, however, significant differences between the two situations.
Cigarettes are deadly when used as intended by the
manufacturers, whereas firearms do not cause tortious harm to
others when used properly. 198  Unlike cigarettes, the harm
caused by firearms typically requires the intervening act of a
third party over whom the manufacturers have no control. 99
The potential dangers of firearms are generally recognized as a
matter of common sense and these dangers are not disputed by
the industry. Additionally, firearms are not addictive and they
produce tangible social benefits.200
While success with these suits could be described as
virtually impossible,201 the cities do not have to win-they must
194 See Joseph P. Fried, N.A.A.C.P. Suit Seeks Change in Marketing and Sale of
Guns, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1999, at B3.
195 See id.
196 Id. Among the restrictions sought is a limitation of one gun sale to any
individual per month. See id. Critics argue that this is not a matter for the court but
rather an issue within the province of the legislature. See id.
197 See David Stout and Richard Perez-Pena, Housing Agencies to Sue Gun
Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1999, at Al. If these suits are successful in bringing
about fundamental changes within the gun industry, the Clinton administration
will have accomplished through legal pressure what it could not do legislatively. See
id.
198 See Barry Meier, It Just Looks Like a Smoking Gun, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
1999, § 4 (Magazine), at 6.
199 See id.
200 See id.
201 The trial courts have already dismissed some of the suits during the
preliminary stages of the litigation. See Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-1941
CA-06, 1999 WL 1204353 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1999) (dismissing the suit brought
by the City of Miami because the plaintiff lacked standing and failed to state a
cause of action under existing tort law); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. X06-
CV-990153198S, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3330 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 1999)
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simply file enough suits to coerce the manufacturers into
settling.202 Additionally, the cities are clearly not as concerned
about winning as they are about forcing fundamental changes in
the gun industry.203 Some manufacturers and trade associations
are already exploring the possibility of reaching an amicable
settlement or, at the very least, taking affirmative measures to
curb the flow of firearms into the illicit market.204 New York
may be the first state to bring a negligent distribution action
against gun manufacturers unless the industry takes certain
precautions. These precautions include marketing of guns in a
more responsible manner, providing sample bullets from every
gun manufactured to the ATF to assist in gun tracing, and
contributing money to the state crime victims compensation
board.20 5
There are significant costs associated with the municipal
suits aside from the impact that they will have on a lawfully
permitted industry. Litigation is expensive and time consuming,
and the outcome is often uncertain. 20 6  Too much judicial
(dismissing the suit brought by Bridgeport Connecticut because the plaintiff lacked
standing and was preempted by state law from regulating the manufacture and sale
of firearms); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. A9902369, 1999 WL
809838 (Ohio Com. P1. Oct. 7, 1999) (dismissing the suit because it was an improper
attempt to usurp the authority of the legislature and restrict interstate commerce).
2 See Butterfield, supra note 14, at A20. California cities, led by San Francisco
and Los Angeles, are suing 31 manufacturers, distributors and trade organizations
under a section of the California Business Practices Law which allows recovery for
"unlawful, unfair and deceptive acts and practices." Id. The plaintiffs asserted that
the defendants intentionally directed sales toward the black market. See id.
203 See id. The objective of the suits is to change the manner in which firearms
are distributed and manufactured, including the addition of safety devices. See id.
204 See Fox Butterfield, Lawsuits Lead Gun Maker to File for Bankruptcy, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 1999, at A14. Bob Delfay, President of the National Shooting Sports
Foundation, the industry's largest trade association, proposed a conference with law
enforcement officials, the National Rifle Association, and gun manufacturers in
order to devise a strategy to curb the flow of firearms into the black market. See id.
Gun company executives met with Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms officials
in August 1999 and indicated that they would be willing to change the two-tier
marketing system so that they would know where their guns are ultimately sold.
See Bai, supra note 19, at 35.
205 See Raymond Hernandez & Fox Butterfield, Two Gun Companies in New
York Talks, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1999, at Al (reporting negotiations between the
New York Attorney General, Colt, and Bob Delfay of the National Shooting Sports
Foundation in an effort to avoid litigation).
206 See STEVEN K. SMITH ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., TORT CASES IN LARGE
COUNTIES 1 (1995) (indicating that on average, it takes eighteen months to dispose
of a tort case). Only three percent of tort cases reach a jury and the plaintiffs in
those cases are successful in approximately half of the verdicts. See id. at 5.
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activism bears the risk of eroding the integrity and separation of
powers between the legislative and judicial branches of
government. Additionally, some of the municipal plaintiffs now
find themselves defending their actions against the gun industry
in a suit brought by the Second Amendment Foundation.207
III. CONSEQUENCES AND CONSIDERATIONS
A. Legislative Response
In response to this recent wave of litigation at least fourteen
state legislatures have acted to prevent suits against gun
manufacturers. 208 For example, during his tenure as governor of
Texas, George W. Bush signed a bill prohibiting Texas
municipalities from initiating lawsuits against gun
manufacturers. 20 9 A similar statute with a retroactivity clause
was enacted by the Louisiana legislature,210 which effectively
nullified the suit previously brought by the Mayor of New
Orleans against the gun companies. 21' The State of Georgia not
only enacted a similar measure,212 but it also drafted a resolution
inviting the firearms manufacturers who have their principle
place of business in Connecticut to relocate to Georgia.213 This
207 See SAF, SAF Lawsuit Headed to Appeals Court (last updated May 16, 2000)
<http://www.saf.org/pub/rkba/news/MayorsUpdate.html>. On November 30, 1999,
the Second Amendment Foundation filed a suit in the federal district court in
Washington, D.C. naming the U.S. Conference of Mayors as well as 23 individual
mayors as defendants. The suit alleges that the mayors, by bringing suits against
the gun manufacturers, have encroached upon the Constitution and interfered with
interstate trade. See id. The Second Amendment Foundation promotes itself as "the
nation's oldest and largest firearms civil rights legal defense, research and
educational organization." Id.
208 See Bush Signs Bill Banning Anti-Gun Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
1999, at All.
209 See S. 717, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999) (enacted on June 18, 1999).
210 See 1999 La. Acts 291 (preempting local governments from bringing suits
against gun manufacturers for damages or injunctive relief).
211 See New Orleans Gun Suit is Stymied by Legislature, N.Y. TIMES, June 4,
1999, at A25 (noting that Mayor Morial intends on challenging the legislation in
court).
212 See H.R. 189, 145th Gen. Assem., keg. Sess. (Ga. 1999) (enacted Feb. 9,
1999). The statute preempts local governments from bringing an action against a
firearm or ammunition manufacturer or a trade association and explicitly states
that the "lawful design, marketing, manufacture, or sale of firearms or ammunition
to the public is not unreasonably dangerous activity and does not constitute
negligence per se." Id.
213 See H.R. Res. 380, 145th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1999) (carried over to
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legislation should not necessarily be viewed as advocating gun
ownership and possession. It is more likely to have been
inspired by the fear of runaway tort litigation that could
eliminate an entire industry and escalate into other dangerous
yet useful activities and products.
B. Financial Considerations
Davis Industries of Chino California, one of the ten largest
manufacturers of handguns filed for bankruptcy on May 27,
1999.214 This raises the specter of other manufacturers acting
similarly; thus, thwarting the goals of the municipal and private
plaintiff suits. Bankruptcy would allow a gun maker to avoid, or
at least reduce, judgments as well as attorneys fees.215 The gun
manufacturers do not have the financial capacity of the cigarette
companies whose sales average $45 billion annually.216 In
contrast, the gun industry grosses only $1.5 billion a year.217 It
has been estimated that tobacco companies spend approximately
$600 million a year defending against suits brought by the
states.218 Gun companies are incapable of financing a similar
defense. 219 They are also incapable of paying any sizable damage
awards. Eventually, so many suits will be filed that litigation
costs alone will consume all of the gun manufacturers'
resources. 220 If the manufacturers are forced into bankruptcy,
potential plaintiffs asserting traditional claims, e.g., a strict
product's liability action concerning an article with a
manufacturing defect will have no recourse and will be unable to
the 2000 Reg. Sess.). The resolution encourages firearms manufacturers of
Connecticut to relocate to Georgia "where they will receive the protection and
encouragement they deserve for their efforts to provide for the common defense,
suppress crime, afford recreation, provide jobs, advance the wholesome and
beneficial science of manufacturing, and numerous other praiseworthy features
which are a natural part of their industry." Id.
214 See Butterfield, supra note 204, at A14 (noting that many of the smaller
companies will file for bankruptcy protection as the number of suits increase,
however, the larger, well-established gun manufacturers will probably not resort to
such a tactic).
215 See Armstrong, supra note 20, at 67 ("They can file for bankruptcy, dissolve,
go away until the litigation passes by, then reform and build guns to the new
standard.").
216 See Rosenbaum, supra note 12, at A32.
217 See Symonds, supra note 17, at 63.
218 See Butterfield, supra note 204, at A14.
219 See id.
220 See id.
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recover any damages. 221 Additionally, the source of a needed
product and its technological advancements will disappear along
with its associated economic activity. Bankruptcy will also drive
the values of existing guns even higher and create more of a
demand for them in the illicit underground market.
C. Subterfuge for Gun Control
High-profile incidents of abhorrent criminal behavior
heighten people's emotions and focus their attention on the
issues of violence and the proliferation of firearms in our
society.222 Likewise, egregious criminal behavior fosters renewed
concerns and demands for gun control.223 The National Rifle
Association insists that the most effective way to address the
problem is to hold those who engage in anti-social behavior
responsible by strictly enforcing existing criminal statutes. 224
The municipal suits seek to hold manufacturers responsible, and
by design, are vehicles for the implementation of judicially
created gun control prohibitions. 225 The suit filed by the City of
Cincinnati is typical. 226 The city sought "injunctive relief which
would require [the] defendants to change the methods by which
they design, distribute[,] and advertise their products
nationally."227 This was deemed "an improper attempt to have
[the] court substitute its judgment for that of the legislature,
something which [the] court is neither inclined nor empowered to
221 See id.
222 See Elizabeth Angell, Guns and Their Deadly Toll, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 23,
1999, at 20 (providing a chronology of infamous criminal rampages, nationwide,
between Oct. 1, 1997 and Aug. 10, 1999). The list of high-profile criminals include:
Russel Eugene Weston, who killed a police officer, a federal guard, and wounded a
visitor in the Capitol Building on July 24, 1998; Eric Harris and Dylan Kiebold, who
killed twelve students and a teacher inside Columbine High School in Littleton,
Colorado on Apr. 20, 1999; and white-supremacist, Buford Furrow, who wounded
five people inside a Jewish community center and then killed a postal worker on
Aug. 10, 1999. See id.
223 See Guns in America: What Must Be Done, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 23, 1999, at
23-25.
224 See id. at 25. The National Rifle Association is a proponent of "Project Exile"
in Richmond, Virginia. The program encourages the strict enforcement of existing
gun laws to prevent and deter crime and is considered very successful. See id.
225 See Butterfield, supra note 14, at A20 (indicating that the goal of the suit is
the reformation of the gun industry and recognition by the cities that they are more
likely to achieve judicially what they have been unable to achieve legislatively).
226 See Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. A9902369, 1999 WL 809838
(Ohio Com. P1. Oct. 7, 1999).
227 Id. at *1.
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do."228 Furthermore, the court held that the injunctive relief
sought by the city constituted a regulation of commercial conduct
lawful in and affecting other states and, as such, was a violation
of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.229
Additionally, one of the primary purposes of suits filed by
municipalities is to force fundamental changes in the way gun
companies conduct their business. 230
Government sponsored suits seeking injunctive relief may
constitute state action; thus raising a Second Amendment 231
issue. The law regarding the applicability and purpose of the
Second Amendment has never been settled.232 The "states
rights" or "collective rights" advocates maintain that the right to
bear arms merely permits the states to establish and maintain
militias. 233 The "individual rights" advocates maintain that the
right is an individual guarantee "inherent in the concept of
ordered liberty."23 4 The courts are divided on the issue and there
is no definitive resolution in sight.235 The subject is too complex
and beyond the scope of this article to adequately discuss. It is
only offered as food for thought in the context of the application
of judicial decrees enjoining manufacturers from engaging in a
lawful activity.
The private suits are also, in effect, an unwarranted and
unwise attempt "to ban or restrict handguns through courts and
juries, despite the repeated refusals of state legislatures and
228 Id.
229 See id. Thus far, federal district courts that have faced the "Commerce
Clause" issue have generally remanded the cases back to state courts, absent
diversity of citizenship, holding that the municipal suits do not present a federal
question involving interstate commerce. See Boston v. Smith & Wesson, 66 F. Supp.
2d 246 (D. Mass. 1999); Archer v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. CIV. 99-40254, 1999 WL
993306 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 14, 1999).
230 See supra note 225.
231 U.S. CONST. amend. II. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed." Id.
232 See United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 600 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
23 See id.
234 Id.
235 See Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 100-01 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
plaintiff lacked standing to sue for denial of a pistol permit because the right is one
conferred upon the states and is not an individual right); U.S. v. Emerson, 46 F.
Supp. 2d 598, 610-11 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that "18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is
unconstitutional because it allows a state court divorce proceeding, without
particularized findings of a threat of violence, to automatically deprive a citizen of
his individual right to possess a firearm").
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Congress to pass strong, comprehensive gun-control
measures."2 6 "[T]he judicial system is, at best, ill equipped to
deal with the emotional issues of handgun control."23 7 The jury
system in these situations is suspect because horrific events are
likely to have a negative impact upon the potential jury pool for
civil litigation involving gun manufacturers. Paul Junnuzzo,
vice-president and general counsel for Glock, Inc., commented, "I
don't want a jury of [twelve] people deciding public policy
because no one's given them a better solution."238 Juries may be
inclined to react passionately rather than apply the relevant
facts in light of the controlling law.
Issues concerning the boundaries and applications of gun
control are best left to our legislative bodies because they are the
physical manifestation of the will of the people.239 Congress has
entered the field and promulgated regulations and restrictions
concerning the sale and possession of firearms. 240  These
regulations are tempered by a provision that gives a qualified
person a remedy for the erroneous denial of permission to
acquire a firearm. 241 Furthermore, Congress explicitly excluded
firearms and ammunition from the definition of a "consumer
product."242  This prevents the Consumer Product Safety
Commission from promulgating regulations banning these
articles. 243 This is a strong indication that Congress intended
that the regulation of firearms remain a legislative perogative.
The courts have generally deferred to the legislature when
236 Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1208 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (holding
that a product must be defective under the product's liability theory of recovery and
refusing to recognize a cause of action for distribution defect); see also Forni v.
Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73, 73 (1st Dep't 1996).
237 Patterson, 608 F. Supp. at 1216. In the Patterson opinion, District Court
Judge Buchmeyer expressed his belief that handguns should be banned but
recognized that this is appropriately a matter for the legislature and not the courts.
See id.
238 Bai, supra note 19, at 35.
239 See Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1202-04 (7th
Cir. 1984); Rhodes v. R.G. Indus., 325 S.E. 2d 465, 467 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) ("While
we recognize with regret the numerous deaths caused by firearms, we are powerless
to remedy the situation without a clear legislative mandate."); Richardson v.
Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751, 757 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the court will not
create a cause of action by judicial legislation).
240 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-30 (1998).
241 See 18 U.S.C. § 925A (1995) (providing a remedy when a background check
erroneously reveals that the person is not qualified to acquire a firearm).
242 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1)(E) (1995); accord 26 U.S.C. § 4181 (1999).
243 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (1995).
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evaluating the utility of articles that are generally available and
widely consumed even though they pose a substantial risk of
harm.244 In the absence of popular action by legislative bodies,
the people themselves can institute change by means of ballot
proposals or voter referendums on Election Day.245 "While there
have been and will be countless debates over the issue of
whether the risks of firearms outweigh their benefits, it is for
[the] [1legislature to decide whether the manufacture, sale and
possession of firearms is legal."246 Gun control in the hands of
the courts will result in inconsistent and uneven results and will
exact a tremendous expenditure of judicial resources.247 Judicial
activism in this area is inherently unfair because manufacturers
will not be able to rely on established principles of common law
or upon statutory proscriptions when governing their affairs. An
activist judiciary is inappropriate when federal and state
legislatures have been active in the field and promulgated
regulations relevant to the issue.248
D. Social Utility of Firearms
One of the central underpinnings of the causes of action
asserted in the cases discussed seems to be that firearms have
little or no social utility while causing great harm. In Copier v.
Smith & Wesson,249 the court pointed out that the plaintiff had
lumped all uses of guns into one destructive purpose, ignoring
legitimate uses such as self-defense, home-protection and law-
enforcement.250  Less than one percent of the firearms in
244 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (1998).
245 See, e.g., NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD, CHARTER REVISION
VOTER GUIDE '99 16 (1999). The general election held in New York City on
November 2, 1999 included a ballot proposal to amend the city's charter. The
proposal contained a provision "requiring people purchasing or obtaining firearms to
purchase or obtain safety locks for all firearms and to use safety locks when storing
all firearms."Id.
246 Forni v. Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73, 73 (1st Dep't 1996); see also Leslie v.
United States, 986 F. Supp. 900, 910 (D.N.J. 1997) (declining to impose liability or
prohibit Black Talon bullets in the absence of legislative action on the matter).
247 See Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1216 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
248 See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 207-09 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (Haerle, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (noting that the issue is
properly vested within the purview of the legislature and that local elected officials
have been attentive to the matter of gun regulation).
249 138 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 1998).
25o See id. at 836.
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circulation in the United States are ever involved in violence. 251
Firearms in the hands of a responsible and capable law-abiding
citizen are an effective deterrent against crime.252  This is
important since government agencies are not obligated to
provide protection to individual members of society.253 Fifteen
major studies have estimated that citizens use firearms in self-
defense between 764,000 and 3.6 million times annually.2 4 A
study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, based upon crime data
reported by the states to the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
reports an annual average of 83,000 defensive firearm uses
between 1987 and 1992.255 This study has been criticized as an
unrealistically low estimate because most local jurisdictions do
not necessarily report incidents involving the justifiable256 use of
force to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the reporting
process in general is flawed.25 7 Regardless of whose data are
most accurate, there are nevertheless a significant number of
251 See H. STERLING BURNETT, NAT'L CENTER FOR POL'Y ANALYSIS, SUING GUN
MANUFACTURERS: HAZARDOUS TO OUR HEALTH (1999).
252 See LAPIERRE supra note 13, at 23.
253 See, e.g., Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1981). The
plaintiffs sustained injuries as a result of the criminal conduct of third parties.
Their injuries were exacerbated and their recovery impeded because of malfeasance
on the part of the police. The court held that there was no special relationship
between the public and law enforcement; thus, the police were under no duty to
provide protection or other services to the general public. See id. at 2-4.
254 See GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 150-89
(1997). Gary Kleck is a criminologist from Florida State University who has
estimated, based upon a detailed survey, that there are 2.5 million defensive uses of
firearms each year. A defensive use means discharging or displaying a firearm in
order to ward off a criminal attack. See id. at 151.
255 See MICHAEL R. RAND, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUST., GUNS AND CRIME: HANDGUN
VICTIMIZATION, FIREARM SELF-DEFENSE, AND FIREARM THEFT (1994).
256 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 35.00-.30 (McKinney 1998) (delineating the
circumstances under which the use of deadly force is justified).
257 See BURNETT, supra note 251 (criticizing the accuracy of the report); see also
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1998: UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS (1999). In its annual report, the Bureau stated:
The Crime Index is composed of selected offenses used to gauge
fluctuations in the overall volume and rate of crime reported to law
enforcement. The offenses included are the violent crimes of murder and
nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated
assault, and the property crimes of burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle
theft, and arson.
Id. at 5. The data contained in this annual report has been criticized because of
questionable imputation procedures and incomplete reporting. See MICHAEL D.
MALTZ, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BRIDGING GAPS IN POLICE CRIME DATA 23-34
(1999).
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occurrences, thus providing a tangible benefit to society. The
report further indicates that "a fifth of the victims defending
themselves with a firearm suffered an injury, compared to
almost half of those who defended themselves with weapons
other than a firearm or who had no weapon."258 "[P]rivate
ownership of firearms has long had a notable effect in reducing
crime, particularly violent crime, as shown by studies by notable
scholars such as Dr. Gary Kleck of Florida State University."259
Firearms have a significant impact on the economy in the
United States. More than twenty million Americans participate
in various shooting sports each year, accounting for more than
$30 billion in economic activity as well as 986,000 jobs. 26 0
Firearms are also used by sportsmen for recreational activities
such as hunting and target shooting.261 One of the lures of
target shooting is that it is a hobby that requires exact control
and self-discipline. The reward a shooter receives, much like in
golf, is the internal gratification associated with one's "conquest
of the laws of physics."262
E. The Slippery Slope
Firearms may be unpopular or, at the very least,
troublesome in the minds of many. Therefore, the imposition of
liability upon manufacturers for the criminal acts of third
25 RAND, supra note 255.
259 H.R. Res. 380, 145th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1999) (carried over to the
2000 Reg. Sess.).
20 See SAAMI: Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers' Institute, Inc.,
Market Size and Economic Impact (visited April 20, 2000)
<httpl/www.saami.orgpublications.html> (relying on a compilation of data
provided by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Agencies, the National Shooting Sports
Foundation and The National Sporting Goods Association). SAAMI is a firearms
trade association that was founded in 1926 and participates in establishing industry
standards. See id.
261 Each year the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
issues nearly 700,000 hunting licenses to residents and over 50,000 hunting licenses
to non-residents. See N.Y. Dep't. Envtl. Conserv., Hunting in New York (visited
April 20, 2000) <http:l/www.dec.state.ny.uslwebsite/dfvmr/worhunt.html>. Further,
the state maintains public lands, called 'wildlife management areas" for
recreational use. The Department of Environmental Conservation promotes hunting
activities in the state and notes that such activities support conservation programs
through licensing fees as well as supporting retailers and tourism. The regulated
hunting system serves to manage wildlife populations and to prevent crop and
environmental damage. See id.
262 Tom Clancy, Foreword in WAYNE LAPIERRE, GUNS, CRIME, AND FREEDOM
xiii (1994).
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parties or the promulgation of regulations by means of judicial
construction may seem palatable. This is precisely the danger
involved in permitting recovery from gun manufacturers. Once
liability is established it may very well destroy the entire
industry. From that point it will only take a short step to apply
the principle to other articles or endeavors that involve an
element of danger or unpleasantness. The bounds of liability
will be limitless and there is no telling where the litigation trail
will end.263 In an interesting case of man bites dog, New Orleans
could have found itself liable to shooting victims in much the
same way it attempted to impose liability upon gun
manufacturers. In February 1998, New Orleans decided to
upgrade the pistols carried by its police force. The city traded
8000 confiscated firearms and 715 police department Beretta
service pistols to local gun distributors in return for 1700 new
Glock pistols that were used to arm the police. The guns that
were traded in were subsequently resold by the distributors to
retailers and, eventually, private consumers. 26 Local
governments may also face liability because they issue firearms
licenses to citizens. The principle of facilitating gun possession
and commerce is the same as the premise underlying the claims
in the suits brought against the manufacturers. 265
The United States Chamber of Commerce, Institute for
Legal Reform is supporting the gun manufacturers. The
Institute for Legal Reform recognizes that once the precedent is
established any industry can be targeted. 266 By analogy, it is
possible to extend this principle to driver's licenses and other
privileges that most people take for granted.
Other legally manufactured and possessed products, such as
263 See Leslie v. United States, 986 F. Supp. 900, 913 (D.N.J. 1997).
264 See BURNETT, supra note 251, at n.116.
265 See David W. Chen, Lawsuit Against a Village Tests the Limits of Gun
Liability, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1999, at B1. The family of a murder victim filed a
suit against Westchester County because the county failed to revoke the pistol
permit of the man whose gun was used in the homicide. The crux of the claim is that
the county was on constructive notice that the pistol owner was unfit to possess a
weapon because of numerous complaints filed against him for harassment and
similar offenses. See id. But see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(1) (McKinney 1999)
(prohibiting issuance of a license to any one convicted of a felony or a serious
offense).
266 See Rosenbaum, supra note 12, at A32. Jim Wootton, director of the
Chamber's Institute for Legal Reform, stated: "They started with tobacco. Now its
guns. This can be used against any industry." Id.
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alcohol, also exact a toll on society. 267 For example, in 1996,
motor vehicle accidents involving intoxicated motorists
accounted for over 13,000 fatalities.268 On an average day during
the same year, it was determined that just under two million
offenders under the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system
consumed alcohol at the time they committed their offense.
269
Furthermore, deaths caused by motor vehicle accidents far
surpass the number of accidental deaths caused by firearms.
270
"In 1998, 41,471 people were killed in the estimated 6,334,000
police-reported motor vehicle traffic crashes, 3,192,000 people
were injured and 4,269,000 crashes involved property damage
only."271 As a matter of fact, traffic accidents account for more
fatalities than homicides, suicides and gun accidents
combined.272 These statistics are presented only to demonstrate
that there are many dangerous activities, some of which are even
more lethal than those involving firearms. Once liability is
established for gun manufacturers, should it be extended to
these other activities as well? Automobile makers produce
vehicles capable of exceeding the maximum speed limit. In a
society where freedom of choice is so highly valued, is it
appropriate to also hold these producers liable because of the
intentional or reckless actions of others?
267 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1998, 110 (1998) (indicating that 20,231 people died from
alcohol induced causes in 1995). For example, some are advocating tort liability for
the manufacturers of sport utility vehicles because of their propensity to inflict more
damage than other types of automobiles in vehicular accidents. See Keith Bradsher,
S.U.V. Suits Still Face Long Odds, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2000, at C20.
268 See LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., ALCOHOL AND CRIME
11 (1998) (providing an analysis of national data by the Bureau of Justice Statistics
regarding the prevalence of alcohol in criminal activity).
269 See id. at 20.
270 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1998, 108 (1998). In 1995, 43,363 people were killed in motor
vehicle accidents and 3,790 people drowned while 992 people were killed in firearms
accidents. See id.
271 NATIONAL HIGHWAY SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC
SAFETY FACTS 1998 (1999).
272 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT OF COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1998, 108-10 (1998) (indicating that there were 35,957 total
deaths by gunfire in 1995 with suicides accounting for 18,503 of those deaths and
accidents accounting for 1,225 deaths).
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CONCLUSION
The attempt to impose liability on the manufacturers of a
lawful product for the harms caused by the criminal actions of
third parties is misguided. The courts should not overstep their
bounds and create law in an area that is properly within the
purview of the legislature. Judicial construction in the name of
public policy can promulgate rules that are diametrically
opposed to the will of the people. The court in Kelly v. R.G.
Industries273 acted in a manner it believed was consistent with
the public policy of the state only to be rebuffed by the Maryland
legislature. The theories of strict liability and strict products
liability do not apply to non-defective products or naturally-
dangerous products that have a significant social utility. Public
nuisance is inappropriate because it circumvents the
aforementioned tort causes of action by applying a negligence
standard to a lawfully manufactured, well made product.
Negligent marketing and distribution should fail absent actual
participation by the manufacturers in facilitating the
underground market. To impose liability because manufacturers
should have known about the latent dangers is too tenuous and
could eventually lead to liability for countless other lawful
endeavors. The suits are also counterproductive because, unlike
the tobacco industry, the gun industry does not have deep
pockets. Vilifying the manufacturers is simply an imposition of
misguided blame. "Somehow guns themselves-pieces of
hardware, no more, no less-have become the source of evil,
while the actions of depraved individuals are conveniently
ignored."274
In the future, the gun industry will have to undergo
fundamental changes and some of the smaller manufacturers
may not survive. The two-tier distribution system will probably
be modified so that manufacturers will know where their
products are going and in what quantities. This is both
appropriate and reasonable. If they resist, they will be
consumed by the litigation costs of defending the municipal
suits. Potential plaintiffs, such as those who are injured by
defective products, may suffer because some of the defendants
will be made judgement proof by the costs of litigation. Both law
273 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985).
274 Clancy, supra note 262, at xiv.
1206 [Vol.74:1167
2000] SUING GUN MANUFACTURERS 1207
abiding gun buyers, and taxpayers-as the purchasers for law
enforcement agencies-will pay more for these changes. Law
enforcement will suffer because manufacturers will not have the
capital necessary to fund research and development of new and
innovative designs. This onslaught of litigation has served to
threaten the very existence of a well-established and legally-
sanctioned industry. More importantly, the adaptation of
existing legal principles to facilitate these suits jeopardizes the
integrity and consistency of the tort system. The courts should
summarily dismiss the suits and defer the issue to the
appropriate legislative bodies to promulgate regulations
affecting the industry.
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